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Medial prefrontal cortical (mPFC) functions may be aspects of ventral or dorsal control
pathways, depending on the position along a rostral–ventral to caudal–dorsal gradient
within medial cortex that may mirror the pattern of interconnections between cortex and
striatum. Rostral–ventral mPFC is connected to ventral striatum and posterior cingulate
cortex/precuneus are connected with dorsal striatum. Reentrant ventral (limbic), central
(associative), and dorsal (motor) corticostriatal loops pass information from ventral-to-dorsal
striatum, shifting hedonic processing toward habitual action. Splitting up unexpected occur-
rences (positive surprise) from non-occurrences (negative surprise) instead of splitting
according to valence mirrors the importance of negative surprise in dorsal habitual con-
trol which is insensitive to the valence of outcomes. The importance of positive surprise
and valence increases toward the rostral–ventral end of the gradient in mPFC and ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex.We discuss paradigms that may help to disentangle positive from
negative surprise. Moreover, we think that the framework of the functional gradient may
help giving various functions in mPFC their place in a larger scheme.
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In a recent issue of Nature Neuroscience, Alexander and Brown
(2011) presented a computational model that suggests that seem-
ingly diverse medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) or dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex responses may be explained by a single construct,
“negative surprise,”which occurs when actions do not produce the
expected outcome. The simulation results demonstrated that a sin-
gle term, not reﬂecting the valence of the outcome, but reﬂecting
the surprise related to the non-occurrence of a predicted event, can
capture a broad range of cognitive control, and performancemon-
itoring effects from various research methodologies. The negative
surprise signals consist of rich and context-speciﬁc predictions
and evaluations.
The model of Alexander and Brown seems compatible with a
theory we recently proposed (Tops et al., 2010; Tops and Boksem,
2011). In short, we proposed that two control pathways developed
during evolution. The dorsal pathway, including mPFC, dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus,
was adapted to control learning and behavior in high-predictable
and stable environments. These systems control behavior in a
prospective, feedforward fashion, guided by context models; mod-
els that are formed in long term memory by the predictability
of the environment/context and kept stable by slow learning. The
ventral pathway, including ventrolateral prefrontal cortex [inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) and anterior insula], was adapted to learning
and behavior in low-predictable environments. In low-predictable
environments, effective context models can not be formed nor
used to control behavior in adaptive ways. Instead, behavior is
guided reactively by momentary feedback control by environ-
mental stimuli. Ventral corticolimbic control pathways incorpo-
rate fast associative learning that is adaptive in low-predictable
environments.
Our theory seems related to the well-known hypothesized dis-
tinction between ventral and dorsal posterior visual processing
streams specialized respectively in processing of “what” and“how”
information (Goodale and Milner, 1992). According to Goodale
and Milner, the dorsal pathway extracts visual signals relevant for
driving automatic or feedforward motor behavior (perception for
action), whereas the ventral pathway extracts information rele-
vant for identiﬁcation and other forms of semantic knowledge.
It has been suggested that these processing streams are extended
toward frontal ventral and dorsal areas that feed back to imple-
ment cognitive control (Sakagami et al., 2006; O’Reilly, 2010).
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (IFG)mediates active maintenance
of stimulus information, and this produces a top-down biasing
effect to drive selection and retrieval dynamics in posterior cor-
tex. On the other hand, one should expect to see dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex activation whenever the dorsal parietal cortex
requires extra cognitive control (such as working memory and
top-down biasing) to carry out the processing of sensory informa-
tion to guide action outputs (O’Reilly, 2010; cf. Sakagami et al.,
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2006). Although similar, compared to this account our model
seems more integrative, associating ventral and dorsal systems
with behavioral programs that include motivation, emotion, vis-
cerosensation, and memory (Tops et al., 2010; Tops and Boksem,
2011).
In many situations and for many tasks, dorsal and ventral
systems will collaborate and interact in the control of behavior.
Alexander and Brown (2011) suggest that negative surprise signals
may provide an important reactive control signal to other brain
regions to drive a change in strategy when the current behavioral
strategy is no longer appropriate. Interestingly, in the same issue of
Nature Neuroscience, Thiebaut de Schotten et al. (2011) reported
evidence for connections between the parietal component of the
ventral attentional network and the prefrontal component of the
dorsal network, especially in the right hemisphere. This and other
ﬁndings (Sridharan et al., 2008) suggest that inputs from right IFG
maymodulate dorsal networks, redirecting goal-directed, or inter-
nally oriented attention mediated by dorsal networks to events
identiﬁed as salient by the ventral network. Additionally, support
has been found for interactions between IFG and dorsal frontal
areas, where IFG implements reactive immediate action accord-
ing to the information conveyed by concomitant input signals,
while dorsal frontal areas implement episodic motivation control:
sustained control over behavioral episodes according to informa-
tion conveyed by temporally remote contextual events (Kouneiher
et al., 2009).
Functions of mPFC areas may be aspects of ventral or dor-
sal control, depending on the position along a rostral–ventral
to caudal–dorsal gradient within medial cortex. A rostral–ventral
to caudal–dorsal gradient was recently found in mPFC, display-
ing a functional shift from responding to events (errors) of a
kind that may trigger the need for “manual”momentary feedback
guided control and learning, via feedforward control learning to
action selection aspects of more automated action control (Nee
et al., 2011). This gradient may mirror the pattern of intercon-
nections between cortex and striatum, as IFG and rostral–ventral
mPFC are connected to ventral striatum and posterior cingulate
cortex/precuneus are connected with dorsal striatum. Reentrant
loops through the ventral striatum terminate in regions of pre-
frontal cortex that are more dorsal than where they begin, forming
ventral (limbic), central (associative), and dorsal (motor) corti-
costriatal loops through which information can pass from ventral
striatum forward into dorsal striatum, and this shift from ventral-
to-dorsal striatum is associated with a shift from hedonic process-
ing toward automated, non-hedonic habitual action control (see
Figure 1; Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011). High density electroen-
cephalographic sourcemodeling suggests that this shift is also seen
in the slowwave during sleep,which propagates from IFG through
mPFC to posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus (Murphy et al.,
2009).
Information about the integration between striatal regions is
obtained from examination of results from multiple retrograde
and anterograde tracing experiments,which demonstrate an inter-
face between ventromedial (limbic), central (associative), and dor-
solateral (motor) striatal regions via the midbrain dopamine cells
(ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra) as well as via corti-
cal areas, that forms an ascending spiral between regions (Haber
et al., 2000; cf. Joel and Weiner, 2000). The ventromedial stria-
tum inﬂuences the central striatum, and the central striatum
inﬂuences the dorsolateral striatum. This anatomical arrange-
ment creates a hierarchy of information ﬂow and provides an
anatomical basis for the limbic/cognitive/motor interface via the
midbrain and cortex (Haber et al., 2000; Joel and Weiner, 2000).
Functional connectivity between the cortex and the striatum in a
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of an interface between
ventromedial (limbic), central/dorsomedial (associative), and
dorsolateral (motor) striatal regions, via ventrolateral corticolimbic and
dorsomedial corticostriatal control pathways and via the midbrain
dopamine (DA) cells (ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra, not
shown), that forms an ascending spiral between regions.The
ventromedial striatum inﬂuences the dorsomedial striatum and the
dorsomedial striatum inﬂuences the dorsolateral striatum. IFG, inferior frontal
gyrus (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex); PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; NAcc, nucleus accumbens/ventral striatum.
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meta-analysis of 126 published functional neuroimaging studies
in humans conﬁrmed this pattern (Postuma and Dagher, 2006),
as did recent studies (Di Martino et al., 2008; Zhang and Li,
2012).
A similar functional subdivision has previously been proposed
between emotional rostral–ventral and cognitive caudal–dorsal
(midcingulate) mPFC (Devinsky et al., 1995; Bush et al., 2000).
Overviewing thewhole cingulate cortex and its striking dichotomy
in structure and function, it has been suggested to participate in
two distinct parts of the limbic system. A rostral–ventral part
engaged in executive functions including those associated with
affect and a caudal part involved in visuospatial andmemory func-
tions. In this context the rostral limbic system includes the anterior
cingulate cortex and ventral striatum, and further the amygdale
and septum, anterior insula, IFG, and orbitofrontal cortex. The
caudal limbic system includes the posterior cingulate cortex and
dorsal striatum, and the hippocampus, and posterior parietal, pos-
terior parahippocampal cortices. Midcingulate cortex would be a
transitional region in this conceptualization of two limbic systems
(Devinsky et al., 1995).
Functionally, depending on the nature of the events within
the learning task, the ventral-to-dorsal shift is seen when learning
proceeds from manual, environmental feedback control to more
feedforward control and eventually habitual control. Ventral con-
trols “assume” unpredictability (Tanaka et al., 2006) and do not
predict temporally distant outcomes. Dorsal controls “assume”
predictability and initiate outcome prediction learning. At the
same time, monitoring of outcome prediction learning enables
estimation of the predictability of the outcome (instrumental con-
tingency), and this calculationof instrumental contingencymaybe
the basis of the subjective experience of control and of selection of
more or less automatization for optimal control (Liljeholm et al.,
2011). Relatedly, individuals with the greater effect of volatility of
predictor–outcome relationships in the mPFC had a higher mean
learning rate, and therefore gave more weight to the most recent
piece of information (Behrens et al., 2007). The central position of
mPFC between reactive ventral control and automated or context
model-guided dorsal control suggests a pivotal role in control of
learning and behavior, as an interface between the ventral and dor-
sal systems. Similarly,Luu et al. (2011) suggest that framing the role
of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex as early context-formation
to temporarily guide actions, permitting current context to guide
learning of new responses in similar situations while supporting
the gradual context-updating process that must occur to support
skilled performance, may serve as a generic theoretical model that
subsumesmore speciﬁc contemporary theories of mPFC function.
Our theorymay explain why, according to themodel of Alexan-
der and Brown (Egner, 2011), surprise signals are split up as
a function of whether they correspond to unexpected occur-
rences (positive surprise) or non-occurrences (negative surprise)
of action outcomes. Alexander and Brown (2011) concede that
positive surprise signals may also be seen in mPFC, but it does not
follow from their model why population activity in this region
should nevertheless be dominated by negative surprise signals
(Egner, 2011). Our theory suggests an explanation. In unpre-
dictable environments, potential threats and rewards are detected
through unexpected salient, positive surprise stimuli (“What’s
that?”). In contrast, in predictable environments, cognitive con-
trol of feedforward, habitual, and/or context model-guided action
involves detecting when actions do not produce the predicted out-
come (“What went wrong?”). Feedforward action control may
further be facilitated by context-speciﬁc “predictions and evalua-
tions of multiple likely outcomes that provide a basis for evaluating
candidate actions and decisions before execution” (Alexander and
Brown, 2011).
The present analysis predicts that Alexander and Brown’s
(2011) suggestion of special importance of negative surprise may
be true for dorsal control areas where negative surprise reﬂects
the monitoring of habitual action control. Indeed, splitting up of
action outcomes according to whether they are unexpected occur-
rences (positive surprise) or non-occurrences (negative surprise)
instead of according to valence, may reﬂect the importance of
negative surprise in dorsal habitual control, as this control is insen-
sitive to the valence of the outcome (Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011).
The importance and occurrence of positive surprise as well as
valence signals may increase toward the rostral–ventral end of the
gradient inmPFC function and toward the IFG.However, negative
surprise and positive surprise are correlated – if a strongly pre-
dicted event fails to occur (high negative surprise), it follows that
the event that did occur will also be very surprising (high positive
surprise). We will discuss a few paradigms, such as contingency
and instrumental contingency learning (Liljeholm et al., 2011),
that may help in disentangling positive from negative surprise.
Our theory suggests that different brain areas should control
behavior in future- vs. present moment-focused ways depend-
ing on the stability and predictability of the environment. There
is some support from human fMRI studies. A study of reward
prediction at different time scales showed graded maps of time
scale within the right IFG–insula and the striatum: ventroante-
rior regions were involved in predicting immediate rewards and
dorsoposterior striatal regions (and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, posterior cingulate cortex) were involved in predicting future
rewards (Tanaka et al., 2004). A follow-up study showed that the
different learning systems in corticostriatal loops are sensitive to
the predictability of the environment: the IFG–ventral striatum
loop is involved in action learning based on the present state,while
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex–dorsal striatum loop is involved
in action learning based on predictable future states (Tanaka et al.,
2006).
Another study in monkeys suggests dissociation between pre-
frontal cortical areas, in which orbitofrontal neurons dynamically
evaluate current choices relative to recent choice values, whereas
mPFC neurons encode choice predictions and prediction errors
using a common valuation currency reﬂecting the integration
of multiple decision parameters (Kennerley et al., 2011). Notice
that the evaluation of current choices relative to recent choice
values facilitates the detection of stimuli that are motivationally
important when action is controlled by a system using only recent
information, i.e., proximate to the present moment. The deviation
from recent values can be regarded a positive surprise stimulus.
The subjective experience of control or predictability varies
with the level of instrumental contingency (Liljeholm et al., 2011),
which is the number of contingent outcomes (expectedminusneg-
ative surprise outcomes) minus the number of non-contingent
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(positive surprise) outcomes. Liljeholm et al. (2011) found that
positive surprise was associated with right IFG and dorsome-
dial striatum activation. In contrast, contingent outcomes were
associated with mPFC and dorsomedial striatum activation. The
composite measure of instrumental contingency appeared to
be associated with mPFC, middle frontal gyrus, and inferior
parietal lobe activation. Notice that in this study the inverse
of negative surprise (the proportion of action-following out-
comes that were contingent) was actually associated with mPFC
activation.
We describe the posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus,
which is connected to the dorsolateral striatum and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, as the dorsal endpoint of the rostral–ventral
to caudal–dorsal gradient within medial cortex, and mediators
of dorsal context model-guided control. This may seem at odds
with proposals that these areas are important in self-reﬂection
and central parts of the default mode network that is active at rest.
However, it may be important to realize that self-reﬂection may
be possible only at rest, and when performing habitual actions, as
in both states attention is not involved in other processes. Self-
reﬂection may involve activation of memories of the self in con-
texts (context models). Although during self-reﬂection retrieval
and action control may partly dissociate, true context model-
guided controlmay involve activation of currently relevant context
models that facilitate behavioral control guided and informed by
previous experiences, involving automated and habitual behav-
iors. The default mode network has been proposed to support
an ability to perform internal mentation by providing a platform
for putting together dynamicmentalmodels and scenarios that are
largely detached from the speciﬁc or current external world (Buck-
ner and Carroll, 2007). Typically, these scenarios would contain
elements of auto-biographical episodic memory and self-related
prospective thoughts. Further, it has been suggested that the pur-
pose for a continuously on-going internal mentation process is to
act as a simulator and predictor of future events that builds upon
previous experiences.
Negative surprise is a different concept than negative predic-
tion error in the classical reinforcement learning approach that
has previously been applied to understand mPFC function. In our
approach as well as in the model of Alexander and Brown (2011),
positive and negative surprise are unrelated to valence and can
be positively correlated. In contrast, positive and negative reward
prediction error in the classical reinforcement learning approach
are negatively correlated and form a dimension of valence (Mat-
sumoto et al., 2007; Kennerley et al., 2011). Recently, a valence-
based model has been proposed that contains units coding for
the value of cues (stimuli or actions) and units coding for the
differences between such values and the actual reward (predic-
tion errors; Silvetti et al., 2011). The model reproduced the mPFC
behavior of previous single-unit, EEG,and fMRI studies on reward
processing, error processing, conﬂict monitoring, error-likelihood
estimation, and volatility estimation, unifying the interpretations
of the role performed by the mPFC in some aspects of cognition.
It will have to be determinedwhether thismodel relates to our the-
ory and how it compares to the model of Alexander and Brown.
Moreover, we think that the framework of dorsal and ventral con-
trols and the functional gradient associated with it, may help in
giving various functions in mPFC their place in a larger scheme.
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